I called my mother the other day. I figured that, as an adult, it was time we had the talk; I asked her what she thought a trademark was. “It means,” she said, “that nobody else can use the same thing.” Sure, but why would we have laws about that? “Because… oh I don’t know, because somebody cares.” After some discussion, it became clear that my mother had both a normal level of interest in Intellectual Property law and held a common misconception. My mother was under the impression that trademark law is for the benefit of corporations.
Because our government is “for the people,” it follows naturally that trademarks are also for the people. In a previous post I wrote that the government grants exclusive rights if some important public good is served. The exclusive use of a mark is not protected for the sake of business but for the sake of the consumer. This information is invaluable to consumers because it allows us to choose between spending our dollars on local, sustainable, organic, humane farmers and butchers and more affordable alternatives with a glance at a package. Thus, when you go out and purchase some first-rate dance gear the branding lets you know the source. When you’re stuck in the middle of Nowhere, Oklahoma, you can rest assured that your can with the familiar Coca-Cola trademark is still a Coke™ because of trademark law.
A corporation can build goodwill and leverage its reputation to add value to its products. If a consumer knows nothing about watches, it’s possible they may be led to believe a Rolex is a good watch because of Rolex’s reputation. While trademarks may serve a corporation’s financial interest, keep in mind that a bad reputation is equally protected. What we, the people, get out of enforcing marks is clear identification of the source of goods. The quality of that source, or its “branding,” is not part of the deal. There are a number of reasons that the USPTO might deny a trademark, but the “morality clause” is most pertinent to marks related to cannabis.
The Lanham Act, the federal level statutory scheme for trademarks, has a “morality clause.” In the language of section 1052(a), any mark that is “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter” can be denied registration. A deceptive mark clearly undermines the goal of keeping the consumer properly informed as to source. This means marks that misrepresent not only the company name but also geographic source, material composition, or sponsorship of some individual, etc. would be considered deceptive and denied registration.
When it comes to scandalous material, an examiner might “know it” simply when they “see it,” in the manner of Justice Stewart’s famous intuitive approach. A morality judgment is treacherous territory, doubly so with the weight of law behind it. It is no surprise that courts have, as the trademark manual of examining procedure puts it, “included immoral matter in the same category as scandalous matter.” Inevitably, scandalousness and immorality judgments will lead to disagreement, and such a subjective standard is not, in my opinion, useful legislative drafting. Retooling the language is probably best, but that is a legislative prerogative, not the purview of lawyers or courts. For a thorough examination of scandalousness and the caprice of the USPTO, I recommend an excellent (and often amusing) journal article by Anne Gilson LaLonde and Jerome Gilson (for those in the know, yes, those Gilsons). Generally, drug-related marks are denied for scandalousness because of the promotion or association with illegal substances under the Controlled Substances Act. There are some cases, like Cocaine Anonymous (note the circled R indicating a registered mark – not “™” which is for unregistered marks) or Marijuana Symposium, where the context specific use is considered within the gamut of federal drug policy. There are ways around USPTO difficulties with trademarking cannabis products, but I think the apparent contradictions in whether a mark is granted or not can be resolved in a different way, without upsetting the status quo.
See, you can also register a trademark at the state level. The Lanham Act, as mentioned, is the federal scheme. Each state has its own version of the Lanham Act that will give statewide trademark protection. Given the patchwork legal status of cannabis in the United States, a state-by-state approach makes a lot of sense. Unfortunately, the statutory language of 47 of those states replicates the morality clause from the Lanham Act verbatim (for a full list check out footnote 3 in the Gilson article). It’s easier to list the outlying states — Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin — than the majority. Of these, Maine comes the closest to a morality clause, denying any mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises language that is obscene, contemptuous, profane or prejudicial… [or i]nappropriately promotes abusive or unlawful activity” (emphasis added). Setting aside Maine’s oddly detailed trademark legislation on potatoes, oils, and sardines, could a mark for a company whose product is cannabis be an “appropriate” promotion of a federally unlawful activity? I think so.
In a state with a morality clause in its trademark statute (like California), is it scandalous to identify a good that is legal in that state but remains illegal under federal law? My answer looks to the late, great, Judge Traynor. In one of his more famous opinions, Reich v. Purcell, Judge Traynor discusses how the “forum must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of the litigants and the involved states.” Judge Traynor was deciding a conflict of laws problem in torts, but his reasoning can be applied here. More succinctly, scandalousness and morality rejections should be based on the weighed interests of the state and federal governments, not a subjective interpretation of those words as applied to a “substantial composite of the general public.”
In a state where cannabis is totally decriminalized, regulated by the state or where the state participates in the market, the public view about offensiveness of a mark is difficult to ascertain. While some groups will surely find no moral/scandal objection to cannabis marks, other groups may find cannabis use scandalous but consider regulation a better solution than outright prohibition. Additionally, the minority may still prefer prohibition and retain scandalousness objections to any cannabis related mark. While scandalousness objections to trademark registration perhaps cannot be resolved, there remain amoral public interest considerations. A given state’s interests and the effects of granting a trademark in that state should be weighed against the interest of the federal government, especially noting that whole supremacy thing. If a state grants cannabis trademarks and, by extension, allows for companies to potentially build goodwill and brand loyalty, will that promote the use of cannabis? Will branding push companies to cultivate a more positive reputation through higher quality products, or safer products and safer use environments?
Further, while the public’s subjective reasoning cannot be ascertained, the codified policy (in this hypothetical) would be one that does not criminalize cannabis. Examiners and their supervisors could decide trademark eligibility by looking to established interests instead of subjective review of “scandal.” Admittedly, changing from “scandal” to “public interest” analysis sounds like jumping out of the bog and into the mire. I think that however scandalized someone feels (or doesn’t) about the Redskins trademark, he or she can concede that our public interest has long proscribed racism, prioritized eliminating discrimination, and promoted equality. Revoking the Redskins trademark arguably serves those ends. This approach also clears up how the USPTO ultimately granted a trademark to an apparently scandalous mark. An image that may scandalize the public by depicting our nation’s flag as a condom was acceptable because of the goal of characterizing the fight against AIDS as patriotic.
Luckily, the interests of the federal government have been clearly set forth in the somewhat notorious Cole memo. The eight priorities listed in that memo can easily be satisfied while serving state interests. A state can serve its own decriminalization regime without subverting these priorities, which explains how a mark can be “scandalous” on a federal level but not in a particular state. Further, the federal government has an interest in allowing states to establish their own unique priorities and policies. This “laboratory of democracy” that respects the individualized needs of specific regions is part of why we have a federal system in the first place. The real question then becomes whether granting trademarks serves a given state’s interest.
Among many details I have glossed over, there is a third option for trademarking: simple use of a mark in commerce grants common law protections without any registration at all, state or federal. This protection is limited to the geographic region of use and depends on common law, which varies by state. California is geographically large and if the consumer is to develop some sense of cannabis products, simple common law protection is assumed not to suffice because a northern California company could use the same mark as a company elsewhere in the state and potentially confuse consumers in between, especially if the market expands rapidly, as it has in Colorado.
If a company cannot build goodwill with its brand it can only really market objectively measurable characteristics like potency and price, not quality. Research indicates that price increases discourage kids from using cannabis more than adults. Granting trademarks would allow corporations to more fully leverage their brand, which would increase pricing of their products – and might decrease potential youth possession and use (which would assuredly remain illegal, just as it is for tobacco or alcohol). There are, of course, risks associated with allowing marks that may be targeted at or appealing to children. An interest analysis supports denial of those types of marks as well, since protecting children is an established interest of both the states and the federal government.
California’s interest might best be served with a model like that of wine, where users of cannabis can pay top dollar for some renowned brand rather than merely finding the cheapest and strongest “high” on the market. Trademark granting should not be based on ambiguous ideas like moral and scandal but on the purposes behind trademarks, which rest on the interests of the individual consumers and states involved.